Nobody knows how Brexit will unfold between now and next March. It’s feasible that the UK and the EU fail to strike a deal, that Theresa May falls, that Jeremy Corbyn is elected prime minister, that Brexit is delayed, or that a second referendum is held. As the Adidas slogan says: “Impossible is nothing.” Only when you look further into the future do things become clearer. I’ve been interviewing many Brexit participants in Britain and on the continent, and have concluded that the two scenarios now being endlessly debated — Britain living under no-deal, or a second referendum killing Brexit — are almost inconceivable. Even if there’s briefly a no-deal, or a second vote is held, neither will stick. Long-term, the most likely outcome is Brino (Brexit in name only) or a very soft Brexit.

Let’s take no-deal first. Many Brexiters would love it: a return to an imagined 1940, minus Luftwaffe bombs. Recent polls show about a third of Britons back no-deal — around double the proportion that want a negotiated deal. Priti Patel, a Brexiter Conservative MP from Brexity Essex who spent her summer recess doorstepping local voters, told me: “I heard a lot of strong language.” Her constituents think the government should stand up to Brussels. They dismiss as weakness plans for stockpiling food and medicine in case of no-deal. Patel largely agrees with them: “Regressive language about no-deal has led to some ridiculous doomsday scenarios.” Brexiter retirees in particular would happily ride out any hit to the economy from no-deal.

Their problem is that most Britons wouldn’t. Slightly over half the population now thinks the UK should remain in the EU, according to every poll since late March. Probably about another 15 to 20 per cent aren’t willing to suffer for Brexit, so two-thirds of Britons will be livid if there is stockpiling, queueing at the border, grounding of planes etc. Many voters would blame Brussels, but they would also blame the Tories — possibly for decades. Labour spent 18 years in opposition after presiding over the strike-ridden “winter of discontent” of 1978/79.

Businesses, trade unions, and even the Daily Mail under its new Brexit-sceptical editor Geordie Greig wouldn’t like no-deal either. So if May’s talks with Brussels founder, or if parliament votes down her proposed deal, the UK wouldn’t simply settle down to no-deal life. Rather, Brexit legislation says that if there’s no deal, parliament must decide what to do. Most MPs feel morally obliged to deliver Brexit, but consider no-deal just too damaging. So, either in January, or within weeks of no-deal causing havoc from March 29 2019, they would probably send whoever is prime minister back to Brussels to “renegotiate” — a euphemism for accepting any deal the EU is willing to offer. In short, no-deal should lead to a rapid deal.

Whereas no-deal is the hard-Brexiter fantasy, the Remainer equivalent is a second vote that keeps Britain in the EU. Let’s imagine that in the chaos after a brief no-deal, parliament votes for a second referendum, even though neither party leadership wants it. Let’s imagine a “Remain” option is on the ballot paper. It still probably wouldn’t win: even many Remainers think the UK should abide by the 2016 referendum.

Let’s imagine nonetheless that Remain wins the second vote. Remainers are only one of Britain’s warring political factions. A narrow victory for them wouldn’t efface the previous referendum. It would merely show (importantly) that the Tories’ hard Brexit isn’t the “will of the people” and needs massive toning down. Moreover, the EU would be mad to bet on the Remain ascendancy continuing. If Brussels lets the UK stay, Brexiters will forever afterwards blame every British problem on what they would consider the illegal decision to remain. Brexit would be the itch that never goes away. Few European officials want Britain back now, anyway. Trust has evaporated, with successive British foreign secretaries comparing the EU to Hitler or the USSR, and ministers hinting they could weasel on agreements with Brussels. Hardly any western European governing parties identify with either the nationalist Tories or Corbyn’s 1970s Labour.

Most European decision makers want Britain out, but they don’t want it going rogue under no-deal. Their nightmare is a post-Brexit Britain undermining the EU as a low-regulation haven for sweatshops, opaque derivatives and chlorinated chickens. Since the UK has no plan for Brexit, the EU could end up imposing its plan: a soft Brexit or Brino, in which Britain becomes a poorer Norway, accepting all European rules including freedom of movement so as to keep trade and travel flowing.

Brino would be a pointless act of self-harm, because Britain would lose all say over the rules by which it lives. Hard Brexiters would hate it. But Brino would solve almost all other problems: it would respect the referendum result, leave the Irish border open, minimise economic damage and satisfy most MPs, businesses and the EU. Brexiters could pretend Brino is just a base camp on the way to Sugarcandy Mountain Brexit. Eventually, the next, Europhile generation returns the UK to Europe, but on worse terms than before. By Brexit standards, that’s a happy ending.